| growth | epistemic status |
|---|---|
| 🌱 seedling | ✅ Sound: I accept that rebirth, kamma, and causality are real; believing otherwise undermines the motivation for wholesome conduct. no-brainer |
The Buddha describes a way of holding skilful view that is similar to Pascal’s Wager. Read here.
The 'safe bet' is assuming belief in rebirth, kamma, and causality
In this sutta, the Buddha is talking to brahmin householders who are bewildered by the number and variety of metaphysical truth claims made by teachers in whom they don’t have saddhā, ‘faith supported by reasons’. Upon hearing this, the Buddha proposes a form of reasoning that doesn’t depend on understanding whether those claims are true or false.
It may still be helpful to know what those claims are, even if I can’t quite understand the language of the sutta (from Bodhi’s translation):
Householders, there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother, no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and brahmins in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world.’
Trying to unpack these claims, it seems the view that Buddha is setting up for rebuttal is:
- generosity has no consequences;
- actions in general have no consequences, whether good or bad,
- in this lifetime or the next;
- how you treat your parents has no consequences;
- this one womb-born life in this realm is the only reality - there is no rebirth;
- there are no practitioners who have experience directly the reality of kamma and rebirth.
People who hold these views, according to the sutta, are expected to have no motivation for wholesome conduct of body, speech, and mind, because they do not see the drawbacks of unwholesome conduct, ‘nor do they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation’.
The Buddha then claims, very explicitly,
Since there actually is another world, one who holds the view ‘there is no other world’ has wrong view.
Rebirth
Such wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) leads to wrong intention (micchāsaṅkappo), and wrong speech (micchāvācā) if one declares that rebirth does not exist, and is in direct contravention of ‘those arahants who know the other world’. He goes as far as to say that holding such a view is explicitly ‘untrue dhamma’ (asaddhamma). Considering skilful speech (sammāvācā) and skilful intention (sammāsaṅkappo) are both aspects of the the Eightfold Path, it makes sense that the opposite of these, along with wrong view, are not saddhamma.
The Buddha continues to elucidate how holding such wrong views leads a person to praise their own view, and disparage others, which itself results in the corruption of any virtue the person might have accrued. All told, these unwholesome states (wrong intention, wrong speech, denial of the arahants’ direct experience, and the propagation of wrong views with ‘self-praise and disparagement of others’) arise with unskilful view as their condition.
Then he presents his version of Pascal’s Wager, saying that a ‘a wise man considers thus’:
‘If there is no other world, then on the dissolution of the body this good person will have made himself safe enough. But if there is another world, then on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. Now whether or not the word of those good recluses and brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no other world: still this good person is here and now censured by the wise as an immoral person, one of wrong view who holds the doctrine of nihilism. But on the other hand, if there is another world, then this good person has made an unlucky throw on both counts: since he is censured by the wise here and now, and since on the dissolution of the body, after death, he will reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. He has wrongly accepted and undertaken this incontrovertible teaching in such a way that it extends only to one side and excludes the wholesome alternative.’
So, if there is no other world, a person who was wholesome in this lifetime is at least protected from the worst suffering here and now - he ‘will have made himself safe enough’. But IF there is another world, a person who was unwholesome because they believed the consequences of their actions would annihilated upon death (believing there is no other world) will THEN be subject to unfavourable rebirth - the will ‘reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell’. But even a wholesome person may be ‘censured by the wise as an immoral person, one of wrong view who holds the doctrine of nihilism’ and therefore suffering unfavourable consequences in this life. IF there is another world, then such a person loses twice: those unfavourable consequences in this life; as well as unfortunate rebirth.
The Buddha doesn’t rely on making the metaphysical claim that there is another world, but argues from the premise that ‘whether or not the word of those good recluses and brahmins is true, let me assume that there is no other world’, concluding that regardless of whether rebirth is real or not, the possible benefits (fortunate rebirth) of assuming it is real are much greater than the probable downfalls (unfortunate rebirth) of assuming it isn’t.
The Buddha then presents the flipside: a person who believes that generosity, and actions in general, do have consequences in both this lifetime and the next, including how one treats their parents and how they view both rebirth and the insights of the arahants.
People who hold these views, according to the sutta, are expected to have motivation for avoiding unwholesome conduct of body, speech, and mind, because they do see the drawbacks, ‘and they [do] see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation’.
The Buddha then claims, equally explicitly,
Since there actually is another world, one who holds the view ‘there is another world’ has right view.
Such skilful view (sammādiṭṭhi) leads to skilful intention (sammāsaṅkappo), and skilful speech (sammāvācā) if one declares that rebirth does exist, and does not contravene ‘those arahants who know the other world’. Holding such a view is explicitly ‘true dhamma’ (saddhamma).
Holding such skilful view does not lead a person to praise their own view, and disparage others, and ‘any corrupt conduct that he formerly had is abandoned and pure virtue is substituted’. All told, these wholesome states (skilful intention, skilful speech, acceptance of the arahants’ direct experience, and the propagation of skilful views without ‘self-praise and disparagement of others’) arise with skilful view as their condition.
Without reproducing the whole opposing passage, I will try to summarise:
So, if there is another world, a person who was wholesome in this lifetime will experience fortunate rebirth. But even IF there isn’t another world, a person who was wholesome still benefits in this lifetime. In this case, a wholesome person benefits twice, or has ‘made a lucky throw on both counts’ to use the gambling metaphor.
Kamma
The logic established, the Buddha then takes a gruesome turn to illustrate another unskilful view that seemed to plague practitioners at the time: a person might go around slaughtering people and plundering villages, as if ‘with a razor-rimmed wheel, one were to make the living beings on this earth into one mass of flesh, into one heap of flesh’ and suffer no consequences; they might, on the other hand, shower the north bank of the Ganges with gifts and offerings, but still with no consequences.
I guess he is refuting a denial of kamma that was present among certain ‘brahmins and ascetics’, who believed that ‘by giving, by taming oneself, by restraint, by speaking truth, there is no merit and no outcome of merit’.
He presents the flipside again, saying there are those who believe in actions having consequences.
Those who deny kamma, however, as with the denial of rebirth above, are expected to have no motivation for wholesome conduct of body, speech, and mind, because they do not see the drawbacks of unwholesome conduct, ‘nor do they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation’.
Then he goes through the formula again: skilful view (consequences have actions) leads to skilful intention, speech, and affirmation of the arahants’ direct experience, and is considered saddhamma, ‘true dhamma’. Holding such skilful view does not lead a person to praise their own view, and disparage others, and ‘any corrupt conduct that he formerly had is abandoned and pure virtue is substituted’.
IF actions have consequences, THEN a person who was wholesome will benefit in this lifetime as well as experience fortunate rebirth. Even IF actions don’t have consequences, a person who was wholesome still benefits in this lifetime.
Switching now to Sujato’s translation, this is summarised in the sutta:
They have rightly undertaken this sure bet teaching in such a way that it encompasses the positive outcomes of both sides, leaving out the unskillful premise.
Bodhi has that final clause as, ‘excluding the unwholesome alternative’.
It’s kind of a no-brainer really: assume that rebirth and kamma are real, because such an assumption motivates wholesome conduct; if they aren’t real, then you have still benefited from wholesome conduct.
Causality
This all got very repetitive a long time ago, but such is the nature of the suttas and we haven’t finished with this one yet. After teaching the skilful view of rebirth and kamma, the Buddha gives the same treatment to causality, saying that there are people who believe
‘There is no cause or condition for the defilement of beings; beings are defiled without cause or condition. There is no cause or condition for the purification of beings; beings are purified without cause or condition. There is no power, no energy, no manly strength, no manly endurance. All beings, all living things, all creatures, all souls are without mastery, power, and energy; moulded by destiny, circumstance, and nature, they experience pleasure and pain in the six classes.’
Grim. Such a worldview is precisely what many Westerners are seeking to escape from by coming over to Buddhism. We came for the logic, and stayed for the agency. I am not about to give up that hope now, and so as far as the epistemic status of these claims are concerned, I can confidently say I consider it true that rebirth, kamma, and causality are real. ✅ Because again, it’s a no-brainer: assume that rebirth and kamma are real, because such an assumption motivates wholesome conduct; if they aren’t real, then you have still benefited from wholesome conduct.
Those who deny causality, however, as with the denial of rebirth and kamma above, are expected to have no motivation for wholesome conduct of body, speech, and mind, because they do not see the drawbacks of unwholesome conduct, ‘nor do they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunciation’.
Denying causality, one is holding unskilful view, which leads to unskilful intention, etcetera. Accepting causality, one is holding skilful view, and has ‘made a lucky throw on both counts’.
Jhanas and the Immaterial Realms
At this point in the sutta, the Buddha takes a turn into questions of metaphysics that cannot be understood or answered without direct experience - we have previously been considering reasoning that supports accepting the possibility of rebirth, kamma, and causality on faith.
Now the Buddha introduces the claim of some brahmins and ascetics that either: ‘there are definitely no immaterial realms’ (Bodhi) or ‘There are no totally formless states of meditation’ (Sujato)1; or there are definitely immaterial realms and their corresponding meditative states.
For a practitioner who has not confirmed one way or the other, the Buddha advises against taking one side and declaring, ‘Only this is true, anything else is wrong’, on the grounds of the same logic as above: even if there are no formless realms, one may still be reborn “among the gods who are formed and made of mind”; if there are formless realms, one may be reborn “among the gods who are formless and made of perception”.
I don’t understand the differences here - just that the reasoning is the same: until I have direct experience of kamma, rebirth, causality, and whether the formless realms or meditative attainments exist or are possible, it is a ‘safe bet’ to assume that they do. This seems to be the most-appropriate epistemic-status in which to hold any metaphysical claim - not quite, “I’ll believe it when I see it”, but “Until I have empirical evidence one way or the other, I will withhold the default skepticism that so characterises my blind adherence to my inherited worldview,” grasping at which is dressed up as sophistication but underpinned by a fear of credulity. It is about not being so arrogant as to say, ‘Only this is true, anything else is wrong’, about metaphysical claims I have no empirical evidence for or against, but which anyone can prove or disprove themselves2. Buddhism does happen to offer a way of testing these claims through direct experience, which the sutta gets into next.
Cessation through Nibbida
At the end of the passage about not assuming anything about the formless realms, there is a short exhortation that one should reflect on the problems associated with form, such as the stock formula about the ‘taking up of rods and swords’, referring to the ‘quarrels, arguments, and disputes, accusations, backbiting, and lies’ that plague the form realms but ‘don’t exist where it is totally formless’. Reflecting thus, one can expect a healthy dose of nibbida, of ‘disillusionment, dispassion’ for form, leading to ‘cessation regarding forms’.
This brings the Buddha to the next dualistic and absolutist claim he is debunking in this sutta: that there is cessation of being; or that there isn’t. Again, we shouldn’t take one side and declare, ‘Only this is true, anything else is wrong.’ IF there is no cessation, THEN it is still possible I will be reborn ‘among the gods of the immaterial realms who consist of perception’3. IF there is cessation, THEN ‘it is possible that I might here and now attain final Nibbāna’.
Those who hold that cessation is definitely not possible are expected to be motivated by lust, bondage, delight, by holding and clinging, but those who hold it is definitely possible are expected to be motivated by non-lust, etcetera, which leads further to nibbida, to ‘disenchantment with being, to the fading away and cessation of being’.
Reading this sutta through again, I see I might have missed an important aspect of Buddha’s taken on Pascal’s Wager, which is that he goes beyond the question of the afterlife with the same logic: whether there is cessation of being or not, being motivated to pursue cessation makes it possible IF it is possible; IF it is possible, but one doesn’t believe so, THEN for them it isn’t possible. If I want to go to the park, I have to believe I can get there. One has to believe it is possible for them to be motivated toward something, so it is a ‘safe bet’ to assume it is possible.
A Buddha Arises
The sutta then awkwardly segues into four types of people, the first three being variously unskilful, and the fourth being the Tathagata, whose teachings give rise to faith in the world. So begins an iteration of the gradual training, which I tend to forget is included in this sutta.
After passing through the first four jhanas, one directs their attention at experience of the Three Knowledges, ending with the Four Noble Truths and the complete cessation of the defilements.
Footnotes
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two translations that each reveal a different perspective on the same phenomena - in Bodhi’s footnote, he says the four immaterial realms are ‘the objective counterparts of the four immaterial meditative attainments’, or jhana. ↩
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paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhī ti, ‘to be individually ascertained by the wise’ ↩
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not sure how I feel about this logic, to be honest - I suppose it is predicated on the assumption we have chose to believe in rebirth already ↩